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ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF LOWER
FEDERAL COURTS, JUDGES, AND THE
RULE OF LAW
Alfred S Konefsky *
THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: LOWER FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION AND THE SECOND PARTY SYSTEM, 1829-1861. By Kermit L.

Hall. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1980. Pp. xvii, 268.
$19.50.
FEDERAL COURTS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: KENTUCKY 17891816. By Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1978. Pp. ix, 234. $16.50.

Kermit Hall and Mary Tachau have written books that at first
glance appear to complement one another in adding to our slim
knowledge about lower federal courts and their judges in post-Revolutionary and antebellum America. Each, however, has a different
historical approach. Tachau is thoroughly phenomenological and
eschews most theoretical inquiry, while Hall confines his analysis
within the parameters of antebellum political history. Both authors
are sound historians, but neither quite knows what to do with his
findings. Although Hall is better than Tachau in wrestling with the
significance of the historical data, neither appreciates fully where the
facts stand in relation to the big picture. Since I cannot convey in a
short review what Tachau and Hall have mined in the way of historical detail, I will focus on only one problem that the books raised by
implication: where the events presented could fit into the current
debate over the historical role of the rule of law.
Professor Tachau's book is built upon a formidable research
base. She has examined the hitherto ignored 2,290 cases that came
before the federal district court in Kentucky between its inception in
1789 and the death of the original district judge, anti-Federalist
Harry Innes, in 1816. Her general argument is relatively straightforward: Innes's court enjoyed a sound reputation within the potentially hostile Kentucky community because it was accessible and
* Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. B.A. 1967, Columbia University; J.D. 1970, Boston College. - Ed.
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responsive, and eventually provided "the most visible" and stable
"link" (p. 191) between the West and the federal government. To
support her thesis, Tachau provides material on procedure, private
civil suits, criminal cases, land disputes, and the enforcement of the
internal revenue laws. Revenue cases accounted for about one third
of the court's business during this period (pp. 6, 95). I would like to
focus particularly on the attempt to impose and enforce the despised
whiskey tax.
Tachau sets the historical scene well. Passed shortly after the
birth of the new republic,
[t]he whiskey tax was designed by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander
Hamilton to defray the cost to the federal government of its recent assumption of the debts of the states. Most Kentuckians thought that
they had already done their part in absorbing state debts by accepting
depreciated currency and by purchasing Virginia treasury warrants for
Kentucky lands, which were proving to be worth little more than the
paper ihey were written on. They strongly objected to paying taxes to
a government that seemed uninterested in solving either of their most
pressing problems: protecting them from the Indians or securing the
free navigation of the Mississippi from the Spanish. Moreover, a tax
on domestic distilled spirits appeared to them to be discriminatory because it did not fall equally on all parts of the country. It seemed unfair because whiskey was often the only common medium of exchange
in the West, where specie was rare. And it seemed oppressive because
it taxed their most valuable export. [P. 98.]
And so Kentucky resisted, not as violently as Pennsylvania, where
federal troops were needed to suppress the famed Whiskey Rebellion, but nevertheless boldly and stubbornly. Kentuckians could resist without violence because they had acquired a powerful ally: the
law as espoused by the federal district court. The legal challenge to
the internal revenue laws employed evasive devices to ensure that
the tax remained uncollectible.
Tachau richly details the federal government's attempts to enforce the whiskey tax. Her examination of conflicting legal and
political strategies and her analysis of the intermittently arrogant
and occasionally incompetent Federalist enforcement attempts is
often perceptive, but her major effort is to tie together two significant
historical ideas: first, the utilization of rigorous English commonlaw procedural technicalities and standards, and second, the surprisingly good local reputation of the Kentucky federal court. She overlooked, however, the most important and illuminating aspect of her
findings, and in the process created, I think totally unconsciously, an
historical illusion.
What Tachau has unwittingly uncovered is that Judge Innes's
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handling of the whiskey tax prosecutions in Kentucky was a classic
example of the manipulation of the rule of law. Judge Innes, a political ally of Jefferson, was systematically making it difficult, if not
impossible, for any Federalist prosecutor to win convictions under
the terms of an act promulgated by a Federalist Congress. By interposing the strict procedural standards of British common law, supposedly antithetical to the Jeffersonian world view, Innes protected
anti-Federalist defendants who asserted their local customary rights
to produce whiskey. He apparently had little compunction in using
the law of the King's Bench, so admired by the Federalists, to further
his own Jeffersonian political principles. He thus managed to hamstring the effective administration of Federalist law by using a favorite Federalist device, English common law.
What does Innes's behavior say about the rule of law as an effective jurisprudential concept in early post-Revolutionary America?
Was the rule of law, as symbolized in this instance by strict English
procedural standards, simply raised, as any legal tool, somewhat
cynically to serve a political, and certainly not neutral, function?
These questions are worth inquiring into, but Tachau is apparently
either unaware of or uninterested in the recent significant literature
on the rule of law' to which her work might contribute. In ignoring
these questions, unfortunately, she may have misperceived events.
In her eyes, Innes quite naturally went about his business in bringing
to the frontier the civilizing, neutral, dispassionate English jurisprudence that legitimated his judging. I suspect Judge Innes was
smarter than that. If in fact, as Tachau contends, Kentuckians
respected their federal court because it enforced the rigorous technicalities of English law, it seems unlikely that they did so out of devotion to English jurisprudence. Such faith would seem almost
counterintuitive. What seems more likely is that Kentuckians
respected Judge Innes because he was willing to use law, from
whatever source, to reach appropriate political results. Law, therefore, was used to further politics. Kentuckians appreciated English
procedure not for its neutrality, but for the services that it could perform in the guise of neutrality.
E.P. Thompson has written of early eighteenth-century England's
Black Act that the rule of law
1. See, e.g., E. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL 25-49 (1974); E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS
AND HUNTERS 258-69 (1975); Hay, Property, Authority, andthe CriminalLaw, in ALBION'S
FATAL TREE 17-63 (1975); F. NEUMANN, The Changein the Functionof Law in Modern Society, in THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 39-43 (1957); Horwitz, Book Review, 86 YALE L.J. 561 (1977).
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could not be reserved for the exclusive use only of. . . [a particular
social] class. The law, in its forms and traditions, entailed principles of
equity and universality which, perforce, had to be extended to all sorts
and degrees of men. And since this was of necessity so, ideology could
turn necessity to advantage. What had been devised by men of property as a defense against arbitrary power could be turned into service
as an apologia for property in the face of the propertyless. And the
apologia was serviceable up to a point: for these "propertyless," as we
have seen, comprised multitudes of men and women who themselves
enjoyed, in fact, petty property rights or agrarian use-rights whose definition was inconceivable without the forms of law. Hence the ideology
of the great struck root in a soil, however shallow, of actuality. And
the courts gave substance to the ideology by the scrupulous care with
petty rights, and, on all occasions,
which, on occasion, they adjudged
2
preserved proprieties and forms.
Thompson's insights seem particularly applicable to Judge Innes's
response to the whiskey tax. By applying English procedural standards - in manipulating the rule of law - Judge Innes nullified
positive law and in effect reaffirmed customary law. The rule of law
thus apparently preserved the integrity of certain neutral and unassailable legal principles. But there may have been a hidden cost.
Though from the perspective of Kentucky whiskey distillers an appropriate and justifiable outcome was reached, the hidden message
was that the rule of law could just as easily be used, in different
hands, to suppress conduct that most would recognize as legitimate.
The rule of law can only pretend to be neutral. Judge Innes intuitively understood that, conveniently situated, it could be used to justify the elevation of one set of political principles over another only
as long as the appearance of neutrality was maintained. In the face
of diametrically opposed political views, the rule of law cannot guarantee that the appearance of evenhandedness and neutrality will
avoid conflict. This is an underlying theme of some interest and importance in Kermit Hall's book.
Hall has written a very able book describing the politics of the
2. E.P. THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 264. In the concluding portion of his book, Thompson
is concerned with the complex relationship between the rule of law and class relations, and in
particular the extent to which law mediated class relations. In reviewing Tachau's book, I
cannot directly address Thompson's theoretical revisions of traditional Marxist thought. First,
I do not know anything about class relations in Kentucky circa 1800, and second, Tachau's
book, one of the few sources available to me on the subject, does not tell me anything useful.

All that appears from the litigation, an extremely risky source from which to generalize, is that
the people against whom the federal government sought to enforce the federal law seemed to
be either individuals relatively isolated from the central government seeking to maintain their

customary rights or Jeffersonian political partisans of some prominence. (The tax collectors, of
course, were Federalists.) Standing alone, this record does not prove that class conflict existed.

I am far more interested, though, in the theoretical implications of Thompson's broader point
about the rule of law as rule of law, pure and simple.
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selection process for federal district court and territorial court judges
from the presidencies of Andrew Jackson to James Buchanan - the
period of the second party system.3 Hall argues that "the distribution of political influence through the judicial patronage during the
era of the second party system can be viewed in the context of political modernization" (p. xv). To determine whether lower federal
court judicial selection is an example of "political modernization,"
Hall focused on two criteria: first, "the extent to which the progress
became institutionalized," and second, "the degree to which a functional elite replaced a traditional elite" (p. xv). Institutionalized judicial selection "tends to become formal, impersonal, automatic, and
bureaucratic" (p. xv), almost Weberian, as it becomes more modem,
and as a result "nominees for appointment to public office are usually selected on the basis of special training and experience" (p. xv),
and become somehow "functional." The movement, then, is away
from "traditional" expressions of political behavior, such as the selection of judges through "an informal hierarchy of kinship and
friendship relations" (p. xv), which was supposedly symptomatic of
presidential lower federal court appointments in the first American
party system dominated by Federalists and Jeffersonians. The vehicle with which the transformation was accomplished, according to
Hall, was the disciplining force of party politics as practiced by
Whigs and Democrats. Parties rationalized what was once left to
traditional kinship and friendship ties. The role of parties can best
be appreciated by tracing the interaction of two constraints: those
that emerged from members of the political party in control, in this
case, the gradual rise of an early form of senatorial courtesy, and
those that emerged from the "executive branch's internal organization" (p. xvii), in this case the allocation of the president's control of
the political patronage process for judicial selection.
In enormous, almost numbing, detail, Hall takes us through a
painstaking re-creation of the judicial selection process in a great
number of appointments in every presidential administration from
1829 to 1861. (I never thought, for instance, that in order to pay my
dues as a legal historian, I would be required to read twenty pages
on the lower federal court appointments of Millard Fillmore.) Along
3. Hall captures the current historiographical characterization of the second party system:
[S]o called to distinguish it from earlier party competition between Federalists and Jeffersonians, [it] began with the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828 and ended with the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860. The second party system was the product of a
distinctive political culture in which popular participation and partisanship replaced social deference and disdain of party.
P. xiii (footnote omitted).
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the way, we are treated to mostly pithy, sometimes cryptic, and occasionally perceptive descriptions of the internal dynamics of the various appointments. Hall describes who was proposing whom, where
the proposers, opposers, and prospective nominees stood within the
various factions in the state parties (there were many factions Whigs and Democrats were hardly monolithic), where the same clusters stood in light of the distribution of power in the House and the
Senate, and what the aspirations of the various presidents were as
they created and then attempted to enforce standards in the appointments process.

I Hall shows a fine command of both the different political situations and the general tendencies and trends. A number of institutional developments did occur - interested senators and

congressmen tended to assert greater control over time, stepping into
the increasing power void created by undisciplined, squabbling,
party organizations and weak presidents without natural constituencies. Eventually responsibility for screening and managing judicial
patronage appointments was transferred from an overburdened Secretary of State to a less burdened and seemingly more qualified Attorney General. Not surprisingly, however, traditional kinship and
friendship ties lingered to a degree despite the increasingly "mod-

em" institutionalization of appointment criteria, as appointment
"mediators" continued to emphasize that these ties could cement

political alliances.
Whether all of this is more "modem" in comparison with other
historical stages or periods is not an issue on which I have a position.
What does strike me as interesting is another theme illustrated by the

pattern of appointments - a pattern that emerged as the Civil War
approached. Sectionalism and slavery dominated the debates about,

and the perceptions of the prospective appointees. 4 Particularly as
4. In addition to analyzing the political considerations that led to appointments, Hall also
includes a substantial amount of very valuable prosopographical data on all the lower court
federal judges appointed during this period. In the process, a kind of input-output problem is
raised. Hall organizes his material in two ways: internally, comparing both district court to
territorial court appointees, and Whig to Democratic presidential appointees; and externally,
comparing the post-1829 appointees to those of the pre-1829 period. (One problem is that the
book fails to make the comparison to the pre-1829 group on the basis of the judicial selection
process itself. We are, more or less, left assuming it was different.) Hall quantifies a good deal
of social historical material - social origins, social standing, education, age, and political activism. It turns out that on the social status side of the equation, there were few internal or
external differences. Both Whigs and Democrats appointed judges largely from the same
"elite or prominent" social class, and ignored those candidates who had only "modest" roots.
And the differences between pre-1829 appointments and post-Jacksonian appointments is statistically quite small. In short, judges generally came from the same social "class," as difficult
as that term is to define, from the Revolution to the Civil War. This fact raises several interesting questions. Not the least of these is how the similarity in class origin (one form of input)
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Democrats Pierce and Buchanan grappled with the dual legacy of
the Mexican War - expansionism and slavery - and attempted to
forestall "the impending crisis," a curious kind of compromise developed. The compromise was based on the perceived need, on the eve
of the disintegration of the Union, to appoint judges, in both the
North and South, who understood the necessity of imposing the rule
of law on the threatened chaos.
The compromise was affected with an eye toward finding a solution to the moral problem of slavery. The rise of the Republican
party in the 1850s was built on the failure of Democrats and Whigs
to confront successfully the moral failings of the state. The legal necessity of preserving the Union "added political fervor to the notion
that in a society paradoxically committed to slavery and human freedom, moral obligation derived from the individual's rather than the
state's understanding of the law" (p. 130). "Sectional harmony"
(p. 149) became the preferred solution. The search for "harmony"
intruded itself into the judicial selection process as well as other aspects of national life since judges were likely to have to make important decisions affecting various aspects of slavery under the
Constitution. 5 Therefore, it was important to appoint judges who
had the true interests of the Union at heart. Judicial appointments
were made to capitalize on and exploit "the image of a disinterested
judiciary" in order to promote "sectional harmony" (p. 149). In theory, the implementation of this program was easy. As long as one
could find "qualified" judges, politically qualified of course, one
could insure success. Federal district judges "in the free states would
enforce the Fugitive Slave Law; their slave-state counterparts would
supervise prosecutions of violators of the neutrality and slave trade
laws" (p. 149). The commitment to the equal enforcement of the
affected the evolutionary pattern of private-law legal doctrine (the output). Obviously the
problem of grappling with enough variables to get an effective model for evaluating judicial
behavior is incredibly complex. But it is an intriguing thought, given that we know so little

about these early judges, that social class may be an important factor in determining ideology.
Obviously social class does not necessariy determine ideology. There can be vast ideological
differences within a social class. But it does appear that lower court federal judges were for a
long time socially homogeneous. The similarities may warrant further inquiry.
5. It does not appear from Hall's study whether the judges appointed in the last decade or
so before the Civil War had any substantial impact on the legal issues surrounding slavery.
Hall makes no attempt to evaluate doctrinal output based on or matched to the political crite-

ria isolated in the appointments process. He follows, for instance, no individual judicial careers. Though beyond the parameters of Hall's study, such an evaluation would have proved
useful in measuring, even in Hall's terms, the effectiveness of the modern, party-directed appointment trend. Finally, for a useful study of how courts dealt with the legal aspects of slavery, see P. FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION (1981).
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law, North and South, free and slave, was designed to defuse the
potential conffict between moral principles.
This strategy failed. As Hall points out:
Equal federal enforcement of the laws did not mean equal justice. The
legal perpetuation of slavery compromised the legal institutions of the
nation to such a degree that the doctrine of judicial impartiality came
to be seen as a violation of the moral imperatives of the more radical
element of the Republican party. [P. 149.]
In a sense, then, the Civil War became a crisis of law and order
because law could not carry the burden of moral violation. The rule
of law, appearing neutral, assumed totally artificial importance - a
mere symbol powerless to prevent the oncoming confrontation. The
legal idea of constitutional union could not incorporate the moral
conception of freedom. What appeared neutral and unassailable the equal enforcement of the law - could not disarm the moral assault on the law's integrity. What reliance on the rule of law had
established was that equality does not necessarily mean freedom.
The attempt to use law to suppress the moral dilemma ultimately
failed, and with it, the right of law to command our unqualified respect.
Though the reasons for the failures of the past may eventually
become clear, it is not altogether obvious how they might aid us in
arriving at what our present alternative visions, hopes, or social theories ought to be. It is not even apparent that we consistently understand what we ought to avoid. What Tachau and Hall have done is
to give us more grist, in very fine historical detail, for the mill.

CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. By
Doris MarieProvine. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1980.
Pp. 214. $18.

The Supreme Court can decide with full opinion between one
hundred and two hundred cases per year out of approximately four
thousand requests that it receives (p. 9). Since review is almost totally discretionary,1 the selection process is extremely important.
What factors distinguish the petitions granted review from the mass
of those filed? The Court publishes no record of individual votes
and no explanation for denials of review; consequently, the standards applied in case selection remain a mystery. Writers interested
in selection standards have had to rely on the published record of
grants and denials of certiorari and published case reports. Doris
Provine's study is unusual, however, because she examines the only
actual data on case selection available from inside the Court.
Through a careful analysis of the docket books and personal papers
of Justice Harold H. Burton, which meticulously record the inner
workings of the Court from 1945 to 1957, she is able to provide a
2
complex and intimate view of the selection process.
In the first part of the book, Provine traces the development of
discretionary review and argues that the court has consistently
sought to increase control over its docket and to "maximize its institutional independence" by minimizing its obligatory jurisdiction (p.
43). The Judiciary Act of 1925 sharply limited the number of cases
that could be appealed as of right to the Court. 3 And the vagueness
of Supreme Court Rule 17, the Court's only statement of its certiorari criteria, insulates the Court from challenges of inconsistent application.
Secrecy and broad discretion in the case selection process have
enhanced the Court's image as the protector of even the most unsophisticated petitioner (p. 44). Provine shows that this image is but a
myth. In 1978 0.2% of the informapauperispetitions were granted
review, compared to 7.8% of paid cases (pp. 44-45). Provine also
argues that the lack of explicit standards, the large volume of cases,
1. According to Provine's figures, cases within the Court's appellate jurisdiction account
for less than 10% of the total docket. P. 10.
2. Justice Burton's papers were unavailable until 1965. P. 5. The only other author using
Burton's records extensively is Sidney Ulmer. Unlike Provine, Ulmer has found a strong correlation between disagreement on the merits of the decision below and voting for review. P. 6.
3. See ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (current version codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 1254, 1257

(1976)).
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and the intricacies of the Court's procedures unfairly advantage ex-

perienced litigants, particularly the Solicitor General. 4 Experienced
litigants learn the formal but unpublished prerequisites of review,
while the volume of cases makes it unlikely that poorly written petitions will receive the attention needed to determine their merit.5
Provine decries what she sees as the resulting unequal access to the
Court.

Despite the problem of unequal access, Provine believes that discretionary review "is part of the foundation of the [Court's] institutional strength" (p. 72), because it enables the Court to side-step
untimely issues. By waiting for the best cases for decision, the Court
maintains its public image (p. 72). Until recently, the Court was
united in the effort to maintain control over case selection. But,
Provine suggests, a split among the justices on the issue of docket
control became evident during the debate in the mid-1970s over

whether to reduce the Court's workload by creating a National
Court of Appeals. 6 Justices favoring judicial restraint seemed to

view the current system of case selection of as a tool of the more
activist members, and hence supported the National Court of Ap-

peals proposal. But Provine points out that broad discretion can also
reflect restraint. She argues that the most serious problem created by
current procedures, and one not considered by either side, is unequal
access (p. 73). While Provine endorses Court-controlled case selection because it furthers institutional independence, she believes that
secrecy in case selection is unnecessary to achieve such independence
and that it promotes unequal access. Since case selection is such an

important aspect of the Court's work, she argues, the public should
be given information about the process (p. 177).
In the remainder of the book, Provine examines previous scholarship on case selection in light of the Burton data. 7 Provine says that
4. From 1947 to 1957 the United States petitioned the Court for review 554 times and had
a success rate of 66%. The United States was respondent in 2,670 cases, 15% of which were
granted review. P. 87.
5. See also Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1270 (1966).
6. The National Court of Appeals would have been inferior to the Supreme Court, but
superior to the circuit courts of appeals, and would have screened cases for the Supreme Court.
See Hufstedler, Courtsh and Other Legal Arts, 60 A.B.A.J. 545 (1974).
7. Other work on case selection includes Brenner, The New Certiorari Game, 41 J. POL. 649
(1979); Earp, Sovereign Immunity in the Supreme Court: Using the Certiorari Process to Avoid
Decision Making, 16 VA. J. INTL. L. 903 (1976); Hanus, Denial of Certiorari andSupreme Court
Policy Making, 17 AM. U.L. REv. 41 (1967); Harper & Rosenthal, What the Supreme Court Did
Not Do in the 1949 Term - An Appraisal of Certiorari, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 293 (1950). Prof.
Harper and three Yale students co-authored similar articles under similar titles for the three
succeeding terms at 100 U. PA. L. REV. 354 (1951); 101 U. PA. L. REv. 439 (1953); and 102 U.
PA. L. REV. 427 (1954).
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previous studies have tended to extremes, some assuming a purely
political, outcome-oriented process, and others assuming a purely legalistic, rule-oriented process. Provine finds both extremes unsatisfactory descriptions of the actual decision making that takes place in
case selection.
Joseph Tanenhaus, 8 who theorized that petitions containing one
or more "cues" would receive closer attention, found a positive correlation between the grant of review and three such cues: (1) cases
in which the United States was the petitioner; (2) cases involving
disagreement between the trial and appellate courts; and (3) cases
involving civil liberties petitions. Provine's examination of the "special lists" used by the Court for much the same period studied by
Tanenhaus leads her to conclude that the one theory does not adequately explain the selection process. Chief Justice Hughes introduced the practice of special listing those cases he thought should not
be reviewed. Any justice could delete cases from the list at any time,
but those remaining on the list after conference were automatically
denied review. Provine's analysis shows that many factors other
than Tanenhaus's cues played a role in special listing decisions. She
identifies five classes of cases more likely to be reviewed during the
Burton period: (1) those in which the United States was a party;
(2) civil rights or civil liberties cases; (3) labor disputes; (4) cases
involving issues of federalism; and (5) criminal cases (p. 83). 9
Provine also rejects Glendon Schubert's game theory analysis' °
of case selection because its underlying assumption - that justices
vote in case selection primarily to further their views on the merits
cannot be supported by her data. The Burton data indicate that
four factors influence the voting behavior of individual justices in
case selection: (1) the Justice's perception of the role of a judge;
(2) his perception of the role of the Supreme Court; (3) his views on
the merits of the case; and (4) the circumstances of the particular
case. Provine found that justices who tend to vote for review do so
in a variety of cases, while those who favor judicial restraint tend to
vote against review "across the board" (p. 130). Thus the justices'
individual convictions about the merits do not influence voting behavior as much as some writers have assumed. Provine therefore
8. Tanenhaus, Schick, Muraskin & Rosen, The Supreme Court's CertiorariJurisdiction:
Cue Theory, in JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 111 (G. Schubert ed. 1963).
9. Provine also finds that the identity of the petitioning party was an important factor
within each of the categories. P. 84.
10. G. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1959); Schubert, Pol-

icy Without Law. An Extension ofthe CertiorariGame, 14 STAN. L. REV. 284 (1962).
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concludes that the justices' perceptions of the proper role of the
Court were the most important factors in case selection during the
Burton period.
Case Selection in the UnitedStates Supreme Court is an interesting and valuable book. It provides a convincing theory of case-selection decisions that does not ignore the complexity of the process,
complexity that makes it difficult to draw conclusions about the
underlying standards applied. Provine recognizes that since the personalities of the justices affect these standards, her conclusions are
somewhat limited to the Burton period. Although the analysis of the
Burton data cannot necessarily be applied to the current Court, it is
useful because it disproves previous assumptions about case selection, and provides intimate glimpses into the usually secret workings
of the Court.II

LAW AND POLITICS: THE HOUSE OF LORDS AS A JUDICIAL
BODY, 1800-1976. By Robert Stevens. Chapel Hill: University of

North Carolina Press. 1978. Pp. xviii, 701. $30.
This ambitious book studies the evolution of the House of Lords
from an eighteenth-century legislative, executive, and judicial body
into a modem appellate court. In just over six hundred densely footnoted pages, Robert Stevens attempts to set forth the entire sociological, jurisprudential, and political history of the House of Lords since
the end of the Napoleonic wars (pp. xvi-xvii). The result, though not
quite the definitive history that Stevens sought to write, remains the
most comprehensive and engaging account of these years yet available to the American reader.
The first half of the book describes the House's highly political
and unprofessional judicial behavior during the nineteenth century,
and the resulting early twentieth-century reforms. Most nineteenthcentury Lords were laymen either unqualified or uninterested in
hearing appeals. The House therefore often failed to muster quorums, faced huge case backlogs, and rendered poor decisions. While
impeachment trials preoccupied many Lords, Scottish appeals based
11. Provine quotes part of one memo to Justice Burton:
Petitioner is a big Cadillac dealer who got caught buying the local Alderman; he has been
fighting conviction for four years; his case has no merit and his brief is replete with overstatements, innuendo, speculation, and almost untruth. It would be a crime to touch this
case.
P. 22 (footnote omitted).
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on Roman law further clogged the docket. All of these failures made
the Lords vulnerable to outside pressures: on several occasions, the
judicial functions of the House were nearly abolished (pp. 52-67). A
desire for self-preservation led the Lords toward reform. At one
time, for example, the House literally forced peers to sit at appeals
(pp. 19-21). The House eventually restricted seats at appeals to special Law Lords who had studied law and were competent to render
professional opinions (pp. 32-34). By the turn of the century, professionalism was becoming increasingly important. When the Lords
lost virtually all of their legislative powers, the balance of law and
politics in the House shifted toward law. Law Lords were then chosen on the basis of their legal abilities, not their politics.
Politics soon disappeared from the Lords' opinions (p. 320).
Central to Stevens's analysis of the post-World War II period is a
doctrine that he calls "substantive formalism." Formalists believed
that judges should avoid making political judgments in deciding
cases: they should rely strictly on precedent, even to the point of
denying themselves the power to reverse their own prior decisions,
no matter how anachronistic. Stevens criticizes this excessive restraint. Indeed, the Lords' rigid refusal to depart from precedent
usually made a final appeal to the House an unnecessary formality
and gave rise to yet another movement to abolish the House's judicial capacity (pp. 321, 415).
New reforms followed. Obeisance to precedent became less important. By distinguishing - and in some cases dramatically limiting - the application of earlier cases, the Lords began to make
policy decisions. The 1966 Practice Statement formally recognized
this development. The statement announced that henceforth the
Lords might reexamine precedent where its value had diminished
over time or where its strict application would produce undue hardship (p. 419). But Stevens cautions that this announcement was only
symbolically important (p. 621). The Practice Statement simply
made it easier for the Lords to do directly what they had previously
done indirectly.
With the rise of the Law Lord's policy-making authority came a
new set of political problems, best characterized as problems of constitutional powers. The controversy over stare decisis (and a parallel
dispute over statutory interpretation) only typify the Lords' difficulties. After all of the reforms of the past quarter century, the Lords
still remain uncertain of their power to interpret acts of Parliament
(pp. 621-27).
Law andPolitics should interest every legal historian. Much of
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the book is cast in the form of capsule biographies that contain concise appraisals of the views and accomplishments of the more important Chancellors and Law Lords. To the extent that Stevens's
attempts to find order and progressive development in one-hundredfifty years of impossibly complicated history fails, it is because the
capsule biographies reveal that none of the periods discussed is as
homogeneous as his historical analysis suggests. The limited tenure
of many of the Law Lords and the few cases that they decided in any
particular area of law make it difficult to trust some of Stevens's generalizations, and the treatment of the many events and cases used in
the biographies often seems disjointed. Few, in sum, will dispute the
importance of Stevens's work. But many will question the suitability
of the method to the task.'

1. For other reviews of Law andPolitics,see Boudin, Book Review, 93 HARV. L. REV. 452
(1979); Gardiner, Book Review, 17 Am. Bus. L.J. 584 (1980); Hiller, Book Review, 14 VAL,
U.L. REv. 171 (1979); Jacob, Book Review, 43 MOD. L. REV. 89 (1980); Recent Publications,
16 HARV. J. LEGIs. 681 (1979).

